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The PhD project study is about ‘stakeholder participation’ in fisheries governance; a concept 
that has become acceptable in all areas of decision-making during the last few decades, partly 
due to dissatisfaction with the performance of fisheries management systems across the world. 
Among other issues, discarding, especially of marketable fish, is a serious and continuing 
problem despite the heavy emphasis on conservation policies. The absence of responsibility for 
industry and stakeholder groups is evidenced as the main reason for the problem. In this regard, 
authors in this field expect that a fisheries governance that entails sharing management 
responsibilities between the authorities and the resource users i.e. ‘co-management’ and more 
recently ‘results-based management’ (RBM) will result into developing a positive feedback 
loop.  
The purpose of this study is therefore to establish a theoretical framework on how and to what 
extent the stakeholders can efficaciously be involved in the management of fisheries, within the 
perspectives of RBM. This central topic is explored through four papers: Paper 1 discusses how 
the proposed discard-reduction management mechanism, i.e. Catch Quota Management (CQM) 
strategy, may be formulated in order to attract fishers’ participation and to make it profitable 
for them to comply with the rules. Paper 2 explores the association between stakeholder levels 
of participation and satisfaction in the decision-making process for the development and 
implementation of the fisheries management plan (MP). This issue is also discussed in paper 3, 
but in light of exploring the important fisheries conditions for success in stakeholder 
participation. Lastly, paper 4 demonstrates what the stakeholder involvement in scientific 
knowledge-production of policy-making may imply for the fisheries science community, but 
also illustrating how science with the incorporation of all stakeholders may be practised to 
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Many of the world’s commercial fish stocks are in a state of crisis, especially due to the way in 
which fisheries are managed (Fernandes & Cook, 2013; Graham-Bryce, 2005; Jentoft et al., 
1999; STECF, 2013; Van Vliet & Dubbink, 1999). While, on the one hand, Holden (1994) 
argues for a reinforcement of the command-and-control (top-down) approach, on the other, 
Symes and Phillipson (1999) put the blame on the top-down approach which is characteristic 
of the traditional (conventional) fisheries management systems.  
As argued in the last two reforms of the CFP (in 2002 and 2013), the lack of stakeholder 
participation in fisheries governance has contributed to the crisis of commercial fish stocks. 
Discards are among the best examples for causing such shortcomings of the hierarchical mode 
of governance (European Commission, 2014). The absence of responsibility for industry and 
other stakeholder groups is seen as the main reason for the serious and continuing problem of 
discarding, despite the heavy emphasis on conservation policies in fishery (Fernandes & Cook, 
2013; STECF, 2013). In this esteem and consistent with research literature, it is repeatedly 
reported that stakeholder participation plays a very crucial role in sustainable fisheries.  
Critics of the hierarchical mode of governance, according to Gray (2005, p. 1), claim/say “that 
only a suitably managed market system can deliver a sustainable fishing industry” and the 
opinion of the majority seem to favour the participatory mode of governance – that is a 
governance strategy that requires designing an effective and innovative fisheries administrative 
framework that engages scientists, policy-makers and the public, so as to achieve shared 
understanding and informed decision-making based on both sound scientific and traditional 
knowledge. As such, there is a demand for a management structure that allows for more and 
successful stakeholders’ participation in the fisheries management. In this regard, the 
proponents of the “participatory mode of governance” expect a fisheries governance that entails 
sharing management responsibilities between the authorities and the resource users, i.e. ‘co-
2 
 
management’ and more recently ‘results-based management’ (RBM), will result into 
developing a positive feedback loop (Gray, 2005; Jentoft, 1989; Jentoft et al., 1999; Nielsen et 
al., 2015; STECF, 2013; Symes & Phillipson, 1999). This is because “governing knowledge 
becomes more adequate, resulting in more satisfactory governing measures, which in turn lead 
to higher management legitimacy and compliance, “accepting the regulations as appropriate 
and consistent with […] persisting values and world views”” (Kooiman & Bavinck, 2013, p. 
23).  
According to Jentoft (1989) the crucial question for the success of stakeholder participation in 
any management scheme could be: what are the measures needed to get stakeholders voluntarily 
to advance their collective interests at the expense of their private interests? In other words, 
what could motivate stakeholders to adhere loyally to the regulations, which are there to benefit 
all? The key elements here include ‘legitimacy’ and issues that entail the sustainability of social, 
economic and environmental aspects: how can regulations be made efficiently appropriate and 
consistent in order for stakeholders to willingly accept them with their persisting values, while 
at the same time allowing environmental conservation measures for sustainability of the 
resources? This is because if stakeholders find the regulatory conditions or circumstances 
adequate for preventing depletion of the resource base and dissipation of the potential resource 
rent, while securing a fair distribution of fishing opportunities and incomes among participating 
groups, there is more reason to believe that they will comply with the management rules. How 
to balance all such relevant concerns is an important governance challenge. The question 
therefore is, how could governance be improved in order to secure the efficient platform or 
mechanism that works in a participatory fisheries governance system? It is in this light that this 
PhD project study explores the practical ways of how to achieve increased stakeholder 
participation in fisheries governance, with the central topic of the study being to investigate 
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how and to what extent the stakeholders can practically be involved in the governance of 
fisheries in Europe. 
Using the umbrella concept of ‘governance’ in fisheries, the study specifically explores the 
project’s topic through four papers: Paper 1 explores how the so called ‘catch quota 
management’ (CQM) mechanism may be formulated in order to ensure continuous stakeholder 
participation. This is conducted by exploring whether and how the properties of CQM 
mechanism attract fisher stakeholder’s participation and how to make the mechanism profitable 
for them to comply with the rules. Paper 2 explores the association between stakeholder levels 
of participation and satisfaction in the decision-making process for the development and 
implementation of the fisheries MP. Paper 3 investigates the fisheries conditions that are 
important to ensure a conducive institutional framework for increasing stakeholders’ 
satisfaction in order to increase their participation. Lastly, paper 4 explores what the transition 
from traditional academic science (top-down approach, i.e. Mode 1) to modern post-academic 
science (participatory approach, i.e. Mode 2) may imply for the fisheries science community; 
specifically, what consequences it might have for the way science is practiced and converted 
into policy, and whether it is time to rethink if this is a move that should be supported.  
The structure of the project study is as follows: 1) Introduction. 2) ‘Governance’: gives a review 
of ‘Governance’ as a key concept used for exploring the objectives of the research project. The 
concept is described using three categorical terms, namely: Hierarchical governance; Market 
governance; and Participatory governance, respectively. 3) ‘Co-management’: denoted as the 
key concept in participatory fisheries governance (de Vivero et al., 2008; Gray, 2005; Jentoft, 
2003). ‘Co-management’ is the focus of interest in this study. 4) ‘From Co-management to 
Interactive Governance’: describes the recent developments in co-management, i.e. beyond the 
concept of co-management. 5) ‘Results-Based Management’: an overview of the results-based 
management (RBM) concept as a version of participatory governance reflecting the 
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developments in co-managing the fisheries with reference to the recent EU’s CFP. 6) ‘Overall 
Study Objective’ Section: describes the research objective that motivates the investigations in 
this project study. 7) ‘Summary of Main Findings and Discussion Points’.  Based on the overall 
study objective, this section summarises the main findings with respect to the four papers, as 
listed in the ‘List of Papers’ Section. 8) Conclusion: an attempt to bring the findings from the 
present work into an immediate practical application. It provides conclusive remarks reflecting 
the disclosure and interpretation of the main findings of the research project.   
Governance 
Governance has been used mostly as an umbrella concept and the term has no agreed definition 
(Gray, 2005). As Tortajada (2010, p. 298) notices, governance is not a synonym for 
government, but “a complex process that considers multi-level participation beyond the state, 
where decision making includes not only public institutions, but also the private sector, civil 
society and society in general”. According to the European commission, ““Governance” means 
rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way in which powers are exercised, particularly 
as regards openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence”, (Gray & 
Hatchard, 2003, p. 546).  
According to Gray (2005) fisheries governance refers to  three categorised modes (structures): 
1) Hierarchical governance; 2) Market governance; and 3) Participatory governance. While 
participatory governance is this study project’s primary focus of interest, the study also briefly 







Hierarchical Governance  
Hierarchical governance used to be the most common style of governing, but this is about to 
change because its dominancy is being challenged by the other two alternative modes. Apart 
from the top-down structure, the hierarchical mode of governance is characterised by “its 
emphasis on legality, political legitimacy, centralisation, bureaucracy, interventionism, 
command-and-control, scientific elitism and exclusivity, and sense of public responsibility” 
(Gray, 2005, p. 3). In the hierarchical governance, fisheries resources are considered as a public 
resource (Gray, 2005). Thus as a public resource, fisheries resources like other common pool 
resources such as ‘air space’ are a prime responsibility of the state (Symes & Phillipson, 1999). 
Dryzek (2005) calls the ideology of Hierarchical governance as ‘administrative rationalism’, 
where the decision-makers are the few experts, and not the majority public. In this respect, the 
psychological basis of hierarchical governance, is Hobbesian (Gray, 2005); implying that:  
“human nature is self-centred and egoistical, and that the only way to avoid “the tragedy 
of the commons” (Hardin 1968) is to institute strict measures of control, backed up by 
force. Typically, this requires fish quotas, days-at sea, decommissioning, satellite 
surveillance, and inspectors on boats and in ports to check that catches and landings do 
not break the rules. In other words, the stick rather than the carrot is necessary to 
discipline fishers’ behaviour that puts fish stocks at risk” (Gray, 2005, p. 3).  
In Europe, as Symes and Phillipson (1999) point out, a good example of Hierarchical 
governance is the UK system where a central government department, such as the Department 
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), makes the most important decisions, and 
further up in the chain of command is the EU’s CFP. The national governments do not have 
much influence over the CFP decisions, and the fishing industry has even less (Gray, 2005).   
According to Van Vliet and Dubbink (1999, p. 22), there are three main criticisms of 
hierarchical governance: 1), the national government does not have a monopoly of knowledge 
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about fisheries, 2), the national government does not have a monopoly of judgement about the 
right measures to introduce to deal with fisheries problems, and 3), the national government 
does not have a monopoly of power to enforce its measures. This is to such an extent that it is 
hardly possible to prevent individuals and groups from undermining government policies, if 
these policies are unpopular. In addition, the British Prime Ministers’ Strategy Unit (PMSU, 
2004) reports that due to the top-down structure as evidenced through the CFP, simple 
command-and-control policies such as the ‘conventional’ cuts in quotas (total allowable catch 
(TAC) system) will not work in complex, multijurisdictional, mixed fisheries. Moreover as 
Gray (2005) notices, the assumption of the TAC system that the “Member States can enforce 
the rules and that fishermen will obey them, […] is for the large part flawed and does not reflect 
the reality of fisheries management in the EU” (Gray, 2005, p. 4).  
Despite the weaknesses of the hierarchical governance, other authors have asserted that the 
national authorities cannot be absent from fisheries governance (Gray, 2005; Jentoft, 2004; 
Kooiman, 1999; Pierre & Peters, 2000). In this regards, there will always be a need for at least 
some element of hierarchy in fisheries governance. As Jentoft (2004, p. 34) points out, “there 
is obviously a public interest in fisheries management, which sector participants and NGOs, 
with their various agendas, cannot and will not always consider”. As representatives for the 
public interests, this means, says Jentoft (2004), the national authorities have a role to play in 
fisheries management, and, for this reason, should not be exempted from the decision-making 
process of the fisheries organisation and management. The authority supplies several vital 
functions necessary for fisheries management, such as, “democratic accountability”, “exclusive 
legal status in negotiations with third countries”, and “legislative and revenue raising powers” 
(Symes, 1999, p. 32), including coercive power, i.e. power to enforce the rules (Gray, 2005).  
Concurrently however, there are limits to what the national authorities can do. As the 
economist, Lindblom (1977) said, the State has no fingers, but only thumbs; implying that 
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fisheries governance must also involve the local community, because the ecological and social 
diversity, complexity and dynamics of fisheries are such that the central authorities cannot 
possibly be on top of every local situation. “The closer one is to the source of the problem, the 
greater is one’s ability to influence it, and the problem-solving ability to complex systems 
depends not on the hierarchical control but on maximizing discretion at the point where the 
problem is most immediate” (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984, p. 208). Therefore, the principles 
of governance must involve all those that have interests at stake in fisheries, and this strategic 
concept is what is called participatory fisheries governance. However, before turning to 
participatory fisheries governance, I will, as already stated above, describe in short, the second 
of the three modes of fisheries governance, namely, market governance.  
Market Governance 
There has been a shift from hierarchical governance to market governance in fisheries during 
the last three decades, following the neo-liberal trend towards deregulation and privatisation 
(Kooiman, 1999). On this neo-liberal theory, the basis of market governance is supply and 
demand, unrestricted by the national authority interference, yet supported by the fundamental 
values of private property rights (Gray, 2005). Premised on von Hayek (1944), Dryzek (2005) 
characterises market governance as ‘economic rationalism’ or ‘leave it to the market’, since no 
one can possibly know how to run the market mechanism due to its complicatedness. As such, 
the market mechanisms should largely run by themselves. Moreover, in theory the ethical 
assumption of market governance is that each person knows best what is in his or her own 
interest (utilitarianism or philosophical radicalism), and psychologically, the assumption 
implies that people are rational in making their choices (Gray, 2005). However, in applying this 
theory of rational choice to fisheries, as a substitute to free supply and demand theory, 
“governments should adjust market carrots and sticks to reward self-interested behaviour that 
protects public resources, and punish self-interested behaviour that damages them, and then 
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leave the forces of supply and demand to get on with it”, (Van Vliet & Dubbink, 1999, pp. 19-
20). 
This mode of market governance, in the case of fisheries, could mean a system of Individual 
Transferable Quotas (ITQs) (Van Vliet & Dubbink, 1999). ITQs are catch-quota share that give 
individuals a privilege to a dedicated portion of the total allowable catch of fish or shellfish in 
a given year. ITQs can typically be bought, sold and leased; a feature called transferability 
(Buck, 1995). The governments use ITQs as a means of regulating fishing. They were 
introduced in tandem with the privatisation of the commons. The ITQs regulatory measure was 
implemented in fisheries due to the assumption that people are likely to take good care of the 
resources that they themselves own (Gray, 2005). As such, based on the doctrine of natural 
resource economics, ITQs were introduced in fisheries market governance, with an idea that 
the measure will give property rights to the fishers, and thereby incentivising the stakeholders 
(in this case fishers) to participate in managing the resources.     
New Zealand, Canada and Australia are the ITQs world leaders, based on number of species 
under ITQ management (Chu, 2009). In Europe, ITQs are currently in operation in countries 
like Norway, Iceland, Denmark, Portugal, Italy and the Netherland, but also in other parts of 
the world such as Chile, Argentina, Namibia, Mozambique, South Africa and the USA (Chu, 
2009).  Nevertheless, despite the trend of deregulation in other fisheries policy areas, in the 
marketing mode of governance, the trend in the EU’s CFP governance has been in the opposite 
direction, i.e. “towards greater regulation”  (Gray, 2005, p. 6). The British PMSU report (2004) 
argues against this. It is recommended in this report to move away from command-and control 
management structure to a “central role for market-driven incentive and mechanisms whereby 
information can be used to influence decision-making by individual businesses” (PMSU, 2004, 
p. 98).  
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Kooiman (1999, p. 143), criticises the market mode of fisheries governance in that it rests much 
upon many simplified-assumptions that are based on views of human motivation, “a one-
dimensional homo economicus”. But, fisheries, in fact rest on more than environmental or 
economical risks. For instance, for some fishers it is at least a way of life, it enables self-
expression and identification, but also as a form of self-determination (Gray, 2005). In addition, 
Jentoft and McCay (2003) report that market governance excludes social and cultural influences 
on fishers’ behaviour, e.g. concern for the marine environment and their community. Moreover, 
just as pointed out above, market governance cannot eliminate the involvement of the national 
authorities for several reasons, including the function of developing the terms of the market, 
while ensuring that the health of the marine ecosystem is not damaged.  
Despite the criticisms of market governance, this mode of governance has one important value, 
“it serves as an important corrective to the hierarchical mode” in that it demonstrates that fishing 
regulations must be economically literate to motivate fishers  compliance, “because rules that 
prevent fishers from making a living will be ignored” (Gray, 2005, p. 7). In fact, market issues 
of governance are required to give incentives for motivating the coordination and cooperation 
of the stakeholders participating in a co-regulated governance (Sverdrup-Jensen & Nielsen, 
1998). Lindblom (2001) notices that the market can be considered as a system of society-wide 
coordination with mutual interactions in the form of transactions. The competition does not 
coordinate the market, but is instead coordinated by a blending of competition and social 







Participatory Fisheries Governance 
The participatory mode of governance is a key interest of this PhD project study. In contrast to 
the hierarchical governance with administrative rationalism of ‘leave it to the experts’, and the 
market governance with economic rationalism of ‘leave it to the forces of supply and demand’, 
participatory governance is depicted by Dryzek (2005) as “democratic pragmatism”, i.e. “leave 
it to the people” (cf. Kooiman, 1999, p. 142). Generally, the participatory concept is about 
citizens and stakeholders. It has the roots in: 1) post-materialism (people are more concerned 
with quality of life than accumulation of material goods); 2) loss of faith in experts, where the 
value of experimental knowledge is becoming increasingly recognised and that the value of 
public judgements prevails over the experts’ value of judgements; 3) the spirit of devolution (a 
need to devolve decision-making to its lowest possible levels); 4) communicative rationality, 
“denoting the contemporary aspiration of civil society to engage in dialogue on the important 
political issues of the day in order to reach more reasoned decisions”; and finally, 5) 
participatory governance has the roots in  the failure of the other two modes of fisheries 
governance (Gray, 2005, pp. 8-9).    
Participatory mode of governance can be divided into four different sub-types (Gray, 2005): 1) 
industry self-regulation, 2) co-management, 3) community partnership, and 4) environmental 
stewardship. However, due to new developments in the concept of participatory governance, 
there is now a new additional sub-type which Gray (2005) did not consider – that is the move 
beyond co-management (Armitage et al., 2007), as we shall see below.  
Although the main focus of this study is ‘co-management’, certain aspects of the other types of 
the participatory mode of governance will also be given due consideration. The 
concentration/emphasis is on co-management because of its distinctive prime feature of sharing 
management responsibilities between the authorities and stakeholders. Co-management has 
indeed been depicted by several authors as very important and central to sustainable fisheries 
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governance (de Vivero et al., 2008; Gray, 2005; Jentoft, 2003; Kooiman, 1999; Ostrom, 1990; 
STECF, 2013). 
Co-management 
Fisheries co-management, the joint management of the fisheries, is often formulated in terms 
of some arrangement of power sharing between the government and a community of resource 
users (Carlsson & Berkes, 2005; Sen & Nielsen, 1996). Co-management is denoted as the key 
concept in the recent developments of theories and customs in fisheries governance (de Vivero 
et al., 2008; Gray, 2005; Jentoft, 2003). The way the concept has evolved from the 80’s to the 
present day is an indication of the direction of the common point of view concerning sustainable 
fisheries management (Jentoft, 1985, 1989; Pinkerton, 1989). Noteworthy, however, is the fact 
that despite the concept of co-management development being relatively recent, its regimes 
have for centuries existed in some parts of the world (Jentoft, 2003).  
Presently, there are many examples on co-management globally: Sverdrup-Jensen and Nielsen 
(1998) have noted co-management in Southern and West Africa, while Nsiku (2001) focuses 
on Malawi; Pomeroy and Viswanathan (2003) and Loucks et al. (2003) among others have 
described co-management in Asia and America respectively. The concept has also been 
described in Australia and New Zealand (Metzner et al., 2003) and in Norway (Hernes et al., 
2005). But, in Europe, even if there are certain examples where co-management exist at national 
level, and the purest form being Norway, Gray (2005) argues that co-management does not 
exist at the intergovernmental level of the EU’s CFP. At national level, however, Gray (2005, 
p. 11) notices that the Netherlands has the strongest co-management system in the EU, “while 
the UK has some features of a co-management system in its sectoral quota management by the 
Producer Organisations (POs) (Symes & Ridgway, 2003, p. 126) and in its regulation of inshore 
fisheries in England and Wales (the Sea Fisheries Committees (SFCs)),” and in Scotland 
(Inshore fisheries groups (IFGs).  
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There are currently some developments in the EU: the establishment of the Regional Advisory 
Councils (RACs) that are now called Advisory Councils (ACs) on the regional level (Gray, 
2005; Linke & Jentoft, 2014; Wilson, 2010) being one example. Only time will tell if this is a 
genuine step towards co-management. Just as the RACs, ACs are established to prepare and 
provide advice on the management of the fisheries on behalf of stakeholders in order to promote 
the objectives of the CFP, but also to facilitate a more direct knowledge-exchange between 
scientists and stakeholders within the ACs (Msomphora, In press). Thus, as Linke and 
Bruckmeier (2015, p. 173) observe, the ACs “describe changes of co-management perspectives 
from formal power relations to more encompassing knowledge practices”. However, before 
ACs would reach co-management their problems regarding representation, deliberation, 
decision-making authority and delegation of power need to be addressed (Linke & Bruckmeier, 
2015; Linke & Jentoft, 2014). 
The advocates of co-management  (Gray, 2005; Jentoft, 2004; Pomeroy et al., 2011; Symes & 
Phillipson, 1999; Van Vliet & Dubbink, 1999) stipulate that there are several benefits to this 
concept: equity; increased transparency; accountability; a wider source of knowledge; 
regulations that are more rational and legitimate; which supposedly would lead to more 
compliance and reduced costs of surveillance. For instance, ‘a wider source of knowledge’ due 
to the involvement of both the government and user groups in co-management, is an important 
component of resolving conflicts, since it allows knowledge integration under the conceptual 
umbrella of knowledge exchange, and thereby enhancement of solution(s) to the conflicting 
interests or values (Fazey et al., 2013; Leys & Vanclay, 2011; Stepanova, 2015). Co-
management is therefore viewed as essential for tackling fisheries diversity (Kooiman, 1999). 
Moreover, as de Vivero et al. (2008) note, co-management stresses the need for strengthening 
local perspectives. They perceive co-management as “a political system which steers clear of 
the cognitive exclusiveness of science and incorporates forms of “folk” knowledge; and all the 
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aspects that this entails” (de Vivero et al., 2008, p. 322). As such, it is hardly surprising that co-
management is the promising candidate to get to grips with such theoretical thinking.   
Co-management emphasises the need for engaging and empowering the fishing industry, 
including the local community, in the management decision-making process. In fact, the form 
of governance in co-management builds on public-private partnership, where management is 
generally shared between government regulators and representatives from the fishing industry 
(van der Schans, 1999). “Power sharing is a must” (Jentoft, 2003, p. 4); implying that there is 
genuine partnership in decision-making between the parties, than just a mere consultation of 
the industry by the government (Kooiman, 1999). This does not mean that co-management 
comes naturally to either side: the respective sides must have some incentive for reaching the 
common good in co-operation (Langstraat, 1999).  
Co-management cannot be forced upon an unwilling industry and/or national authority (Symes 
& Phillipson, 1999). The industry side may lack the professional skills or the financial resources 
(capacity) to mobilise the important issues in managing the fisheries, while the government may 
be reluctant or unable to share power with the industry. The major problem lies in building trust 
between the two sides, and to ensure stakeholder satisfaction with their participation in fisheries 
management.  
Amongst the several definitions of co-management expounded by various authors (Nielsen et 
al., 2004; Noble, 2000; Sen & Nielsen, 1996), Jentoft (1989, pp. 423-424) defines co-
management as “the collaborative and participatory process of regulatory decision-making 
among representatives of user-groups, government agencies and research institutions”. This 
definition focuses on the establishment of a democratic and inclusive management system: a 
system that involves the relationship between the government and the associations that 
principally represent fishers as user-groups for sharing responsibility of management task, 
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while ensuring that the government remains primarily as an arbiter in a complex assemblage 
rather than one of the cornerstones of the system occupying the highest position in the hierarchy 
(de Vivero et al., 2008). Co-management’s prime form of argument is the need for political 
effectiveness and legitimacy that lacks in the conventional top-down management systems, and 
this is how it has persistently been perceived even in the subsequent traditions. Therefore, as 
Kooiman (1999, p. 260) notices, “this model is more than an option: it is a necessity.” 
Stakeholders are most likely to abide with decisions/policies, which they strongly identify with 
and feel a part of. 
Despite all the potentialities of co-management as pointed out above, the practical experience 
and observation evidence for the efficiency and workability of co-management solutions in 
fisheries management is still scarce (Castrejón & Defeo, 2015; Symes, 2007). Questions still 
remains over how to successfully attain stakeholder participation from the fisheries 
organisations dedicated to this purpose. Co-management, as argued by Gray (2005, p. 12), “is 
easier to establish at local levels, where it may resemble community partnership, but it is more 
difficult to organise on a larger scale, because of the greater diversity of fisheries interests.” 
Nevertheless, its advocates insist that it is at the higher levels where co-management strategy 
is needed most (Gray, 2005). In this regard, (as noted in the Introduction Section of this thesis), 
the EU’s CFP has suggested a fisheries governance that entails sharing management 
responsibilities between the authorities and all those interested in the resources – that is ‘co-
management’ but with characteristics that pertain to two sub-types or versions of participatory 
governance: ‘industry self-regulation’ and ‘environmental stewardship’.   
‘Industry self-regulation’ assumes that the stakeholders have the sole responsibility for running 
the fishery (Sutinen & Soboil, 2001; Symes & Phillipson, 1999). However, this does not imply 
that industry self-regulation is entirely independent from the authorities, but autonomous only 
within certain limits. For instance, the fisheries industry, e.g. a fisheries organisation, cannot 
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set aside safety rules laid down at national or international level (Gray, 2005). This depicts a 
strong resemblance between industry self-regulation and co-management, where “power 
sharing is a must” in managing the commons (Jentoft, 2003, p. 4). Notably, this is also one of 
the prime characteristic in results-based management (RBM).  
‘Environmental stewardship’ reflects the growing power of environmental concerns. As Gray 
(2005) notices, integrating environmental issues in fisheries is considered essential in the new 
version of participatory fisheries governance. This requirement is often characterised using the 
concept of the ecosystem-based approach (EBM), which encompasses fisheries as part of the 
marine ecosystem management (Frid, 2005). Thus, environmental stewardship involves 
inclusion of environmentalists as stakeholders in co-managing the fisheries, in collaboration 
with the government and user groups themselves. Hence, the environmental stewardship has 
certain implications of co-management as a type of participatory mode of fisheries governance, 
but beyond the concept. In this regard, environmental stewardship has aspects in common with 
the EU’s newly suggested management mechanism for ensuring fully documented fisheries (the 
CQM). The purpose of the CQM mechanism is to manage the fisheries at an integrative 
approach, where environmental concerns are of prime importance for the potential to account 
for all catches, reduce discards, provide better scientific data and encourage fishers to fish more 
selectively through catch-quotas using sensor and camera technology (Dalskov et al., 2012). 
And more so to induce industry self-regulation. 
The new concept of co-management as suggested in the EU’s CFP also has the characteristics 
pertaining to the third type of participatory fisheries governance: community partnership. It 
(community partnership) requires sharing management responsibilities with the whole range of 
local stakeholders who have the interest in marine resources (excluding the government). While 
the newly suggested fisheries governance devolves more of the management responsibilities 
from state to stakeholders, the central government continues to exercise a good deal of control 
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(directing overall policy) because of its basic obligation to take care of the commons on behalf 
of its citizens’ common interests (Symes, 2007). 
The recent developments in the concept of participatory governance suggest a changing 
discourse, from co-management, where fisheries management policy is driven to a large extent 
by four primary sets of actors: users (fishers), scientists, government administrators and elected 
officials (Jentoft et al., 1998), towards a system that involves more than these four groups. 
Therefore, the recently advocated governing marine system within which fisheries is situated 
involves the entire interested public, which in addition to the four primary sets of actors also 
includes consumers, local community, and other stakeholder groups such as environmental 
interests, as well as international bodies. Such a move towards a more interactive, more 
‘democratic’ and broader participatory governance is beyond the traditional concept of co-
management; called hereafter as the ‘Interactive governance’ approach (Kooiman & Bavinck, 
2005).   
From Co-management to Interactive Governance 
Whereas the literature previously talked about co-management, it now tends to talk about the 
same issues under the label of interactive governance. What is the difference between ‘co-
management’ and ‘interactive governance’? The shift from ‘co-management’ to ‘interactive 
governance’ points to a change in two dimensions. The first is the shift in relevant participants, 
from users (particularly fishers) to a whole array of stakeholders, and the other is the shift from 
‘management’ to ‘governance’. What does this shift imply? 
Co-management used to be preoccupied with fishers as a principal user group and oriented to 
resource management as the primary management problem (Armitage et al., 2007). ‘Interactive 
governance’ includes a much wider range of stakeholder groups and concerns. As an extension 
to the concept of co-management, ‘interactive governance’ can be described as a management 
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system approach that recognises the full array of stakeholder interactions, and entails managing 
a fishery as part of the marine ecosystem within which it is situated; rather than considering a 
limited stakeholder participation, with the resource management as the primary management 
problem, or ecosystem services in isolation. This implies that the shift from co-management to 
interactive governance involves a change from fisheries ‘management’ to ‘governance’. In 
other words interactive governance incorporates the idea that the managers should not be 
confined to the goal of maximising sustainable yield of targeted resources as in co-management, 
but be expanded to the goal of protecting the health of the whole ecosystem, with all its species 
e.g. fish, sea mammals and benthic organisms, and together with their natural habitats (William, 
2005). Human issues like social, economic and environmental aspects (social-ecological issues) 
are also included in the management list, since without their inclusion, some natural phenomena 
in managing the marine resources may be impossible to manage (Galaz et al., 2008). Interactive 
governance therefore advocates wide participation in governance from a normative as well as 
from a practical point of view, but more so, the shift induces changes in procedures for making 
and implementing decisions. Its purpose is meant to serve more than just the sustainability of 
fisheries resources. The whole interactions are considered in order to “solve societal problems 
and to create societal opportunities, including the formulation and application of principles 
guiding those interactions and care for institutions that enable them” (Kooiman & Bavinck, 
2005, p. 17). 
The implication, of the literature review as described above,  is that interactive governance is a 
combination of multi-stakeholder participation and ecosystem-based approach (EBM) (Frid, 
2005). Compared to co-management, such an approach in managing the fisheries has more 
potential to make the management of the marine systems more efficient and democratic (Linke 
& Jentoft, 2014; Stringer et al., 2006). As with co-management, interactive governance 
approach strongly recommends that management planners (authorities) need to engage 
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stakeholders earlier, more often, more meaningfully, and through an open and transparent 
process (Dougill et al., 2006; Gopnik et al., 2012). This encourages the flexibility and success 
of stakeholder participation in the decision-making processes for the management of the 
sustainable fisheries in a holistic approach (Gopnik et al., 2012). Equally important, both 
approaches, co-management and interactive governance in managing marine systems affirms 
the value of bringing unlike parties together at the earliest opportunity to learn, talk, and listen 
to others with whom they rarely engage (Gopnik et al., 2012). Just as in co-management, 
stakeholders in an interactive participatory-management approach have something to gain from 
each other (Gopnik et al., 2012; Gray & Hatchard, 2008). But, in contrast to co-management, 
which used to be preoccupied with resource management as the primary management problem, 
interactive governance approach enables the stakeholders to have the right to decide how the 
marine resources (within which fishers resources are situated) as a whole are used, and gives 
them (the stakeholders) a duty to do so responsibly (Gray & Hatchard, 2008).  
Although it is true that with the wider range of stakeholder participation there is a greater chance 
of improving fisheries management, there is a danger of persuasive stakeholders in obstructing 
efficient management. A broad array of stakeholder participation is reported to inflict more 
conflicts and  transaction costs (Gray & Hatchard, 2008). In support of this, Grafton et al. (2006) 
report that a wide range of stakeholder participation may allow special interests to block 
conservation. In their argument, it is pointed out that voluntary participation in the regulatory 
process leads to overrepresentation by industry members with extreme preferences or special 
interests, which can result in sacrificing long-run conservation for short-run economic 
considerations. It is also stated that the greater the number of stakeholders, the smaller the roles 
each stakeholder plays, and the lesser the importance of the traditional sectors (de Vivero et al., 
2008).  Besides, the cost of stakeholder participation in terms of time and logistical resources, 
is high, such that the funds that could have been best used in implementation of management 
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issues is misused (de Vivero et al., 2008). A broad array of stakeholder participation could also 
reduce decision-making forums, where the persuasive stakeholders take the place of 
deliberative dialogue about efficient management (Gray & Hatchard, 2008). Furthermore, not 
all stakeholders may have the skills to understand scientific discussions about the ecosystem 
and its interactive complexity, and not all scientists have the skills to understand how the social 
system works (Gray & Hatchard, 2008; Linke & Jentoft, 2014).   
Conversely, the danger of excluding stakeholder participation altogether is also a threat to the 
success of sustainable fisheries management. Through the dialogue, exchange of knowledge 
and democratic vote among the stakeholders, it is likely that an interactive governance approach 
may help to ease the dangers of special interests (persuasive stakeholders) obstructing good 
management practices. As Pitcher (2001) and Livingston et al. (2005) infer, it is not wise, for 
example, that the managers (national- authorities) develop the management plan(s) based on 
biological or environmental indicators without the reference to the stakeholder engagement. 
The use of different perspectives from a wide range of stakeholders (sources) gives a more 
complete overview of required knowledge, and thereby creating a more robust factual base and 
reducing management uncertainty (Berkes, 1999; Olsson et al., 2004; Woodhill & Röling, 
1998). In addition, Daniels and Walker (1996) point out that incorporating the perspectives of 
all stakeholder groups minimises conflict, while allowing creation of ‘a common knowledge 
base’ about the main management issues, which then feeds into the decision making process, 
like with the production of a new management plan. In fact, as observed by Coser (1956), 
conflicts, in the context of interactive governance, can have a positive function as it brings 
stakeholders together, clarifying and communicating about their interest and values. In support 
of this, the work of Walters et al. (2000) on Glen Canyon Dam on the Colorado River also 
illustrates the efficiency of using the interactive governance approach. They show how changes 
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in such an approach led to the transfer of benefits from one stakeholder group to another, 
necessitating the development of a shared vision with input from all stakeholders.  
Interactive governance therefore increasingly engages the stakeholders deeply into the 
management of the marine systems. Compared to co-management, which targets fisheries 
resource sustainability, going beyond co-management (interactive governance) brings mutual 
contribution to the sustainability of the targeted and untargeted marine resources. It serves as 
an important rhetoric function in managing the marine systems. However, the interactive 
governance compared to co-management in managing the marine and fisheries systems 
respectively is complex (Armitage et al., 2007; Gray & Hatchard, 2008; Hawkins, 2007), 
especially as we move away from top-down, centralised management approach to more 
developed and participatory approach. The so-called ‘sectorial’ approach to management, as 
was in co-management, involving information exchange with a limited number of stakeholder 
is relatively simple, whereas the new holistic interactive governance approach involving a 
broader range of stakeholders could become increasingly complicated.  
Notwithstanding the limitations, the benefits in using interactive governance approach 
overpower the complexity (Gray & Hatchard, 2008). By encouraging a broader range of 
stakeholders to work in the framework of social-ecological system (cf. McGinnis & Ostrom, 
2014), relationships can be transformed, changing people’s perceptions of each other’s views, 
and enabling them to identify new ways of working together, thereby strengthening the 
stakeholders’ responsibilities in protecting the future of the target and non-target species and 
natural ecosystem-habitats as a whole. Thus, moving beyond the co-management approach 
could ultimately lead to better results and sustainability of the fisheries and marine ecosystems 
as a whole (Arheimer et al., 2004; Armitage et al., 2007).  
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The concept of interactive governance is currently being made popular in the research on EU 
policies (Denters et al., 2013). Such a governance version of co-managing the fishery can be 
reflected in what the EU’s CFP recently refers to as ‘results-based management’ (RBM).   
Results-Based Management 
Based on the European Commission’s suggestions, RBM can be delineated as defining an 
acceptable impact and then leaving it to those concerned to identify the means to meet the 
requirements and to document the effectiveness of the means (Nielsen et al., 2015). RBM is a 
management strategy focusing on performance and achievement of results. But can RBM be 
considered as co-management?  
RBM-based strategy can be viewed as a refined and more astute type of top-down management, 
applying co-management principles for low-level management functions (Fig. 1). It calls for a 
division of responsibility between the national authorities1 and the stakeholders2 as it delegates 
defined responsibilities from the former to the latter. It has the characteristics of co-management 
but yet beyond the concept. This is because with linkage between user-groups and national 
authorities, the users (fishers) participation in decision-making is the primary concern in co-
management, while with RBM, it is essential that all stakeholders participate in decision-
making but on condition that they comply with the rules as specified by the national authorities. 
It requires that there is a clear distinction between who decides upon the strategic and 
operational regulations. The role of the national authorities is to decide and follow up on a 
relatively small set of specified and enforceable outcome targets or results (objectives)3. How 
                                                          
1 National authorities represents the public interests and have enacting authority in pursuit of the policy objectives decided for a fishery. In 
the EU context, national authorities may be comprised of agencies at a CFP level (i.e. the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament and 
the European Commission) as well as decision-making agencies at a member state level (i.e. national ministries). Their role is not to regulate 
actions in details (micromanagement) as in the conventional top-down hierarchical governance, but to facilitate, advice, and oversee self-
management of industry stakeholders.   
2The stakeholders acts as an organisational unit with delegated authority to develop management plans and oversee or conduct fishing 
operations within the standards decided by the national authorities. Stakeholders include all users groups and no longer being explicitly 
limited to the fishers. (All those that have interests at stake in fisheries, including the environmental interests). 
3Outcome targets (objectives) are specific and measurable performance goals defined for a fishery on the basis of agreed and appropriately 
authorised general goals, standards and principles, as defined by the authorities based on the policy objectives. Outcome targets are found 
in policy documents, for instance the specific objectives for the future CFP listed in the Green Paper on the future of the common fisheries 
policy (CEC, 2009). 
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these objectives are going to be pursued and achieved is left to the stakeholders on the condition 
that the results are acceptable; implying that access to fisheries resources comes with certain 
obligations for stakeholders regarding proper management and care of marine environment. 
Those who exercise responsibility in a proper and effective manner are the ones who enjoy the 
stakes of the fisheries (CEC, 2009). Within EU, the catch quota management (CQM) 
mechanism provides a good example on this. The authorities have established the standards for 
documentation, audits and control (system of documentation) system, and those stakeholders, 
in this case the fishers, who comply, or loyally adhere to the system’s regulations enjoy the 
access to fish stocks. They (the CQM fishers) are awarded incentives through the grant of more 
fishing days at sea and additional catch quota to their normal TAC (Msomphora & Aanesen, 
2015).   
 
Figure 1: Illustrating results-based management (RBM) system in fisheries management. 
Based on the RBM definition above, the suggested management system (RBM) can be 
illustrated by Figure 1. The figure is generated to reflect the new form of co-management, RBM, 
23 
 
as suggested in the EU’s CFP. It (Fig. 1) includes three key components i.e. national authorities, 
stakeholders and assessors4. As a representative for the public interest, the national authorities 
have the final responsibility for resource management. However it is the stakeholders that 
propose and implement the management plan (MP), which documents that the outcome targets 
(OTs) are achievable through a suggested set of management measures (Nielsen et al., 2015). 
The assessors review the documentation provided by the stakeholders. To enhance legitimacy, 
the assessors are preferably institutionally independent from both the authorities and the 
stakeholders (assessors do not have interests at stake in fisheries). The assessors carry out 
assessment on whether the OTs are achieved or not (or assesses the extent of achievement). The 
assessment provides stakeholders a basis for modification of the MP, and for the national 
authorities it may provide the basis for imposing sanctions (if OTs are not achieved), rewarding 
achievements, or revising OTs (Nielsen et al., 2015).  
It is important to note however, that the RBM approach presents a quandary to the authorities: 
while on the one hand the national authorities would like the stakeholders to essentially self-
regulate the fisheries, on the other, they (the authorities) are often nervous about granting too 
much autonomy to stakeholders. National authorities fear of losing control of a situation for 
which ultimately they will be judged accountable (Symes, 2007). That is why, in the EU 
fisheries, despite the fact that in RBM the means to meet OTs are supposed to be defined by the 
stakeholders, it is the authorities (the European Commission under a Directorate-General of DG 
MARE) and not directly the stakeholders, who decides upon technical measures i.e. total 
allowable catch (TAC)5, as the prime management means to meet the OTs. It should 
                                                          
4Assessors acts as an organisational unit with a competence in evaluating the extent to which specific and measurable policy objectives, as 
pursued within management plans developed and implemented by stakeholders, are fulfilled. Preferably, assessors are recommended to 
be an independent body from both the national authorities and the stakeholders.  
5 TAC is calculated based on the stock status referred to as spawning stock biomass (SSB) and fishing mortality (F) values. The SSB and F 
values are considered in regards to the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) and the precautionary approach (PA) reference points in concern 
with stock assessments and advice provided by the International Council for Exploration of the Sea (ICES). 
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nonetheless, also be noted that TAC could also be an example of the OT depending on the 
context of the prevailing management approach. For instance, in the context of discard ban and 
landing obligations6, the authorities give the fishers TAC as the OT measure with the goal of 
reducing unregistered fishing mortality, thereby providing better scientific data, and to 
encourage fishers to fish more selectively, and thus reduce unnecessary fishing mortality 
(Msomphora & Aanesen, 2015).  
It is not unusual in policy areas for governments to promote the advantages of decentralisation 
while in fact strengthening control from the centre (Phillipson, 2002). In inshore fisheries, there 
is therefore a proper concern to avoid creating a confused and potentially dysfunctional mosaic 
system of co-management, which could hamper their strategic management (Symes, 2007). For 
example, it is arguable whether stakeholder organisations, such as the Scottish IFGs which are 
central to this thesis, would welcome the transfer of more responsibility, without adequate 
management powers of implementing their MP (lack of legislative power) and supportive 
formal resolutions for gear conflicts (Msomphora, 2015) . In some cases, the worry is whether 
stakeholders will have the resources and capabilities (adequate fisheries conditions) to cope 
with the added burden (Msomphora, 2015; Phillipson, 2002). The need, therefore, is not 
necessarily “for ‘less state’, but for a more effective, accountable, and a responsive state” to 
stakeholders’ concerns, which was in the first place the reason for the establishment of the EU’s 
RACs/ACs (Anon., 2005). As such, the CFP reforms through ACs at least allow the 
stakeholders to indirectly provide advice on the management of the fisheries on behalf of all 
stakeholder groups (Msomphora, In press).   
                                                          
6 Landing obligation in the reform of the EU’s CFP represents a fundamental shift in the management approach to fisheries, i.e. switching 
the focus from the regulation of landings to catches as well as introducing regionalised decision-making into the management of the EU 
fisheries (STECF, 2014) .  
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Stakeholder participation in decision-making, from the initiation of the management plan to its 
implementation, has been recognised in Europe’s recent CFP, as a key ingredient of good 
governance (STECF, 2013). However, with RBM strategy, an important dilemma concerns how 
the national authorities can trust the information documented by the stakeholders, since the 
authorities will not attempt to regulate the conduct of the industry in details. Instead the 
stakeholders are left considerable discretion with regards to how they conduct the fishing, as 
long as they achieve the targets specified for the fishery in question (Nielsen et al., 2015). Under 
such conditions self-interested stakeholders may actually document what the authorities want 
to hear (Collins & Evans, 2002; Kraak, 2011). Therefore if the stakeholders do not develop an 
MP with a system which is able to document that the OTs are achievable through suggested set 
of management measures, they always have the option to deceive the system (Kraak, 2011). 
Hence, the impact assessment report (D-G MARE, 2011) on the performance of the current 
CFP conducted by the Director-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (D-G MARE) 
suggested a management mechanism that can fully document the fishery with active 
involvement of the resource users in fisheries management, within the perspectives of the RBM. 
Emanating from this suggestion, the Catch Quota Management (CQM) mechanism has 
currently been adopted as an integral part of the CFP (European Commission, 2014; STECF, 
2013). Nevertheless, while RBM strategy attracts considerable support (Aanesen et al., 2014; 
Msomphora, In press; Nielsen et al., 2015; Pita et al., 2010), it must be ensured that knowledge 
produced for policy-making in fisheries management should remain reliable, have credibility 
and be trustworthy. This is so because with RBM-based fisheries, the production of scientific 
knowledge involves more than just scientists. Apparently, the 2002 and 2013 Reform of the 




Likewise, as with co-management, the RBM arrangement gives the stakeholders greater 
influence over the fisheries management, but the shift in management responsibilities imposes 
various challenges and risks to stakeholders (Linke & Jentoft, 2013). The stakeholders, for 
instance, need necessary capacity to fulfil the management role so that in reality the burden of 
proof is shifted from the authorities to the stakeholders (Hoggarth et al., 1999). Several issues 
can influence the stakeholders to successfully take the responsibilities of management functions 
such as developing reliable MP proposals. As with democracy, co-managing the fisheries 
between the national authorities and stakeholders is no easy challenge. Enabling legislation and 
organisational reform are necessary, but not sufficient.  
It is argued that stakeholder participation cannot work well in an RBM setting under less than 
ideal fisheries conditions (Msomphora, 2015). Capacity building and psychological 
empowerment is required. More so, it needs a supportive social and cultural environment.  Co-
managing the fisheries at the community level may not work if the individuals in the community  
do not do their tasks, and for the community individuals to manage doing their tasks, the 
stakeholders must be properly organised to be effective in co-regulating the management 
process (Jentoft, 2004). RBM may produce biased outcomes if some stakeholder groups are 
better organised than others. This can be exemplified through the authors’ experience during 
the IFGs’ interviews in Scotland (Msomphora, 2015). Compared to those who were less 
satisfied with their IFG organisation (IFG leadership), it was observed that those who were 
more satisfied perceived themselves to be more involved in the decision-making process for 
managing their fisheries. Organisational formation must thus take place prior to, or as an 
integral part of, co-management institution building (Jentoft, 2004).  
Having come thus far, participatory governance and co-managing the fisheries between the 
national authorities and stakeholders seems evident enough to satisfy the notion of ‘good 
governance’ (Fig. A1). However, although it may satisfy notions of good governance, their 
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ability to deliver better policy, more effective management, and sustainable fisheries is still 
questionable. In the search to improve the efficacy of fisheries governance, it is in the interest 
of this PhD project study to explore how and to what extent the stakeholders can efficaciously 
be involved in the management of fisheries, within the perspectives of the results-based 
management. 
Overall Study Objective 
The aim of the study is to explore how stakeholders can engage in and take responsibility for 
management functions. The focus is on the aspects of how stakeholders can be incentivised for 
motivating their coordinative and cooperative participation in co-managing the fisheries. It is 
also to demonstrate what stakeholder involvement in the production of scientific knowledge for 
policy-making may imply for the fisheries science community, while shedding light on how 
science, with the incorporation of all stakeholders, can be practised to provide valuable 
knowledge for policy-making without compromising the ethos of science as an institution.  
Using the concepts discussed in the previous sections, the project’s research topic(s) cover 
different aspects of, or arenas for, stakeholder participation. They appear as follows: 
Paper 1 explores the issue of stakeholder participation using the EU’s newly proposed discard-
reduction management mechanism called catch quota management (CQM). The CQM 
mechanism embraces both the hierarchical governance with ‘a top-down approach’, where the 
central authority sets and enforces all rules; and the participatory fisheries governance with ‘an 
industry self-regulation approach’, since the responsibility for the practical implementation of 
the management functions is left in the hands of the stakeholders. In addition, the CQM 
mechanism leaves to the stakeholders the responsibility of providing the authorities with the 
information about the fishing activities, so that it becomes possible to monitor performance and 
take corrective action. Such practicalities of CQM mechanism may enhance stakeholder 
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engagement in management processes and in the production of scientific knowledge, which 
could lead to better policy-making and management of the fisheries, while ensuring the 
industry’s self-regulation. The setup of the CQM mechanism provides a prominent candidate 
to examine whether and how stakeholders can efficiently be engaged in fisheries management.     
Thus the main discussion in paper 1 is on how to formulate the CQM mechanism in order to 
attract stakeholders’ participation (fishers’ participation) and make it profitable for them to 
continuously comply with the rules. Through such an analytical discussion, the CQM 
mechanism could help to illuminate the question of stakeholder participation for good 
governance in fisheries management.  
Paper 2 examines the association between stakeholder levels of participation and satisfaction in 
the decision-making process for the development and implementation of the fisheries 
management plan (MP). The paper specifically deals with the relationship between stakeholder 
participation and satisfaction perceptions regarding the decision-making process, in addition to 
assessing possible factors that may further explain the hypothesised relationship. 
Paper 3 is an addendum to paper 2, but in light of exploring the important fisheries conditions 
for success in stakeholder participation. The paper aims to explore to what extent and under 
which conditions stakeholders can be engaged successfully in the development and 
implementation of management plans. It identify conditions that may or may not be strictly 
necessary for making stakeholder participation work in fisheries management.  
In this light, Papers 2 and 3 are complementary in that they both look at the issues of stakeholder 
participation based on the Scottish IFGs in the North West Coast of Scotland. Scottish IFGs 
aim at developing and implementing a transparent, accountable and flexible management 
structure that puts local stakeholders at the centre of decision-making processes for the 
management of their fisheries (Scottish Executive, 2005). The government, however, has to 
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complement it by providing enabling information, legislation and enforcement mechanisms, 
and other assistance required. The IFGs’ strategic framework reflects a governance system 
beyond the concept of co-management. It tends to collectively incorporate biological, 
economic, environmental and social issues within the scope of ‘interactive governance’. The 
strategy emphasises commitment to utilising the knowledge and experience of fishers in 
fisheries management, and recognises the importance of industry involvement in achieving 
compliance with regulations. But more so, it ensures the participation of all interested 
stakeholders including scientists and environmentalists in order to provide a structure, which is 
well placed to absorb or adapt to changes in approaches to managing of the marine environment 
(Scottish Executive, 2005). Thus, while the remit of IFGs primarily focuses on the management 
of commercial inshore fisheries, it does not prejudice the interests of other legitimate users of 
inshore resources and or marine environment as a whole. Following such a strategic framework, 
IFGs’ stakeholders in Scotland are reported to have successfully finished developing their 
management plans (MPs), which are approved by the government and currently (by April 2014) 
in the implementation phase (Msomphora, 2015). In this context, the Scottish IFGs as case 
studies represent a relevant opportunity for providing pertinent chance in gaining lessons on 
how the incentives and social groundwork are developed on institutions managing fisheries 
activities such that it is enough to achieve a successful stakeholder participation in the decision-
making process. 
Paper 4 investigates the issue of stakeholder participation in scientific knowledge-production 
of policy-making in fisheries management. The paper provides insights into the consequences 
and dilemmas of the shift from ‘top-down’ towards ‘participatory governance’ mode of 
managing the fisheries. The idea is to explore what happens if we move from a science that is 
exclusive to stakeholder participation (Mode 1) to an open science (Mode 2) that enables more 
stakeholder participation. In this regard, the European fisheries management research, with 
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focus on the involvement of International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), as the 
major fisheries research and advisory institution in Europe, provides a relevant case study for 
illustrations.   
The objective of the discussion in paper 4 is therefore to inquire into what the conceptualised 
transition from Mode 1 to Mode 2 science ideals may imply for the fisheries science 
community, i.e. what consequences it might have on the way science is perceived, practiced, 
legitimised, and converted into policy, and whether it is time to rethink if this is a move that 
should be supported. The paper demonstrates the predicaments that are involved in maintaining 
the reputation of science for policy-making while avoiding dilution of the values that are 
associated with Mode 1 science.  
Below is the summary of the findings and discussion points with respect to the four papers.  
Summary of Main Findings and Discussion Points 
Paper 1 
The average price per kg of the fish landed indicates that the CQM mechanism may work in 
order to reduce high grading. Generally, the results show that CQM fishers do have higher 
average gross income (DDK 2166480) compared to fishers harvesting according to the 
traditional landing quota mechanism, i.e. LQ rules (DKK 1961050). There is therefore an 
incentive for fishers to participate in the CQM trial and harvest according to the CQM rules. 
However, the findings also illustrate that with the possibility to cheat and mimic the harvesting 
behaviour of the LQ fishers, CQM fishers may achieve an even higher gross income. This 
means they may have an incentive to cheat and harvest according to the LQ rules. Nevertheless, 
the increase in their gross income decreases with increasing probability of getting caught, 
because it becomes expensive to cheat, as they have to pay the fine for cheating. Hence, the 
CQM fishers’ expected gross income of the CQM fishers when fishing honestly is higher 
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compared to when they mimic LQ fishers. But, with more than 50% chance of not being caught 
cheating, the results indicate that the fishers will be better off if they do not comply with the 
rules of CQM mechanism. In this case, the CQM mechanism, as it materialised in the Skagerrak 
demersal trawl fisheries, indicates to be not incentive compatible (IC); the reason being CQM 
vessels may cheat and earn a higher gross income by mimicking LQ vessels. 
The results therefore suggest that for the CQM mechanism to be IC, the CQM fishers must earn 
DKK 344590 (Alternative1), 234120 (Alternative2) or 294240 (Alternative 3) more than the 
LQ fishers, given no cost advantage for any of the groups of the fishers. Note that these amounts 
are too high if CQM fishers have a cost advantage when mimicking LQ fishers’ behaviour. 
When CQM fishers do not cheat, they ‘only’ earn DKK 205430 (DKK 2166480 – 1961050) 
more per vessel per year compared to LQ fishers. This implies that the CQM fishers, although 
catching more cod and other valuable groundfish species as European plaice and haddock, will 
still be better off if they mimic the LQ vessels’ harvest and landing patterns. 
Paper 2 
The results indicate a positive relationship between stakeholders' perceptions of satisfaction and 
participation in fisheries management. Stakeholder satisfaction perception, fishing gear type 
and fisheries dependence significantly predict the degree of the stakeholder participation 
perception. Fisheries dependence had negative influence on participation perception.  
Compared to NWIFG, the results generally show that the OHIFG stakeholders tend to be more 
agreeing to all investigation statements for satisfaction and participation perceptions. The 
OHIFG are more likely than NWIFG stakeholders to fall towards the high-end agreement scale-
level of the stakeholder perceptions of participation and satisfaction. The results suggest that 
adjusting the model for age, education, dependency on fisheries, experience, fishing gear and 
the stakeholders’ PO membership, decreases the difference in level of agreement between the 
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NWIFG and OHIFG to the response-statements of satisfaction and participation perceptions 
towards the decision-making process for the development of the MP. This means that 
demographic and business characteristics can influence stakeholders’ participation in the 
decision making process, independent of their satisfaction perceptions towards the process.  
In agreement to previous studies (Pita et al., 2010), the current study notices that there are 
numerous reasons contributing to lack of participation in the decision-making process. The 
study portrays that the less the stakeholders are listened to, the less happy they are with the 
process. The less the stakeholders are happy with the decision-making process in developing 
and implementing the MP, the less they are of the opinion that the MP will improve the fishery, 
hence reducing their satisfaction of their participation in the process. In addition, the results 
indicate that, with good leadership, it is possible to increase the level of stakeholder satisfaction 
in decision-making processes and hence the participation.  
Seventy-four per cent of the involved OHIFG stakeholders, who happened to have already 
started implementing their MP by April 2014, were of the opinion that they have a good 
leadership, whilst only 26% of those from the NWIFG who reported not to have started 
implementing their MP, believe that their leadership is good. In this regard, the study results 
strongly suggest that good leadership may help to ensure stakeholder satisfaction of their 
participation in fisheries management. Good leadership is therefore fundamentally essential for 
improving stakeholder participation in decision-making processes for fisheries management.  
Paper 3 
The outcome shows that all the essential conditions that enable stakeholder involvement in 
fisheries management, as pointed out by some eminent scholars (Hoggarth et al., 1999; Jentoft 
& McCay, 1995; Ostrom, 1990; Pinkerton, 1989; Pomeroy et al., 2011; Pomeroy & Williams, 
1994), exist in OHIFG except for two: formal conflict resolution and the right to manage.   
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There are problems of conflicting interest between the stakeholders. For instance, there is a 
problem of conflicts between the static gear and trawler boats fishers.  Resolving gear conflict 
is difficult and complicated at the moment, as no concrete formal system is in place.  
There is also a problem of management power between the local stakeholders and the 
government-authority since the role of OHIFG up to now, as any other Scottish IFG, is to act 
as an ‘advisory’ body to the managing authorities (government officials) and not ‘management’ 
body as initially stated. The IFGs are not yet legislative schemes. Consequently, the OHIFGMP 
measures that require additional legislation to be introduced are a challenge to enforce 
compliance. This remains a challenge for MP implementation, and the tension between the 
government-authorities and the local stakeholders within the IFG remains. 
However, despite the lack of formal ‘conflict resolution’ and ‘right to manage’ conditions, 
OHIFG stakeholders express satisfaction with their participation in fisheries management. They 
are highly satisfied with their participation in decision-making process for the development and 
implementation of their MP (cf. Msomphora, 2015), which they successfully developed (their 
MP is accepted and approved by the government-authorities for implementation). This is 
interesting because such findings mean that it may be unreasonable to require that local 
institutions must have the rights to manage, since such rights in the modern setting ‘by 
definition’ are invested in coastal states (UNCLOS, 1982). Those conditions that currently do 
not formally exist, at least suggest being not necessary conditions for stakeholder participation, 
although I am willing to speculate them only as de facto7 essential conditions. This implies that, 
in the formal sense, ‘conflict resolution’ and ‘the right to manage’ are not strictly necessary 
fisheries conditions for successful stakeholder participation. As such, it can be concluded that 
the existence of formal ‘conflict resolutions’ and the right to manage’ are not that important as 
                                                          
7 Existing in actuality, especially when contrary to or not established by law (American Heritage®, 2011). 
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long as the fishery in question has a system or mechanism in place that can help to ease the 
situations between conflicting stakeholders such that at least they can come to a compromise 
that will satisfy them all. 
In spite of tensions between the stakeholders, the collaborative spirit remains high. In 
collaboration, stakeholders are able to create methods that can provide a means of producing 
support and of sharing responsibilities for hard decisions that inevitably pose problems and 
challenges to their roles in managing the fisheries. In agreement with Coser (1956), such results 
portray that conflicts between stakeholders can be argued in terms of interactive process, and 
depicts conflict as ‘a form of socialisation’. A collaborative participatory management system 
does not have to be free of conflicts to succeed, because no group can be entirely harmonious, 
especially in a commons (Coser, 1956). As such, conflicts, in the context of sustainable fisheries 
management, must be regarded as necessary components of development: “they open 
possibilities to improve resource management and find ways towards sustainability through 
experimenting and collective learning (as in an ‘interactive governance’). Reframing conflict 
resolution as conflict transformation and embedding it into the frames of learning, knowledge 
use and integration,” can provide a solid groundwork for successful stakeholder participation 
while co-managing the fisheries sustainably under the strategy of RBM (Stepanova, 2015, p. 
118). 
Paper 4  
The move from ‘traditional academic science’ (Mode 1 science) to ‘modern post-academic 
science’ (Mode 2 science) is controversial within the scientific community. According to 
Dankel et al. (2015); Hackett et al. (2008); Hessels and Van Lente (2008); Jasanoff (1996); 
Ziman (1996a, 1996b), Mode 1 science is changing to Mode 2. The transition is drawing the 
traditional science into a new sphere of activity (Ziman, 1996b), thus undergoing a cultural 
transformation, which involves radical change of many traditional practices and values. What 
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might be happening is that the transition of Mode 1 to Mode 2 is closing the gap between pure 
science and applied research.  
Scientific developments are blurring the distinctions between fundamental and exploitable 
discovery. Such a merge not only raises practical issues of funding, intellectual property rights, 
disciplinary identity, criteria of excellence, career aspirations, and institutional management, 
just to mention a few; but it also seriously threatens the most central value of academic science 
(Mode 1), namely, its objectivity (Ziman, 1996a). Objectivity makes science valuable to society 
because it gives the public a guarantee of reliable disinterested knowledge.  
With Mode 2 science, the assurance for quality justification of science using what Merton called 
‘organised scepticism’ (Cole, 1992; Merton, 1973, 1996), i.e. peer review, will be lost. Even if 
peer review may be perceived as the only real mechanism for protection of science against the 
embodiment of serious errors in the knowledge that is produced, experts’ technical skills 
(extension of peer review) will eventually take its place for evaluation of ‘good scientific 
knowledge’. But, on the other hand, as Weingart (2011) points out, the blurring distinction 
between science and policy-making may encourage science to become aware of the public 
interest, which is good because it will make the produced knowledge useful, accepted and 
productive to society. It may influence the policy-makers to adapt their way of thinking to the 
produced scientific knowledge. Thus, while politicians will try to influence science for their 
own benefits, following the logic of the scientific knowledge for policy development may give 
an assurance that the developed policy are underpinned with solid and more democratic, 
scientific knowledge (Lidskog, 2008). 
Due to the last two reforms of the CFP (in 2002 and 2013), where stakeholder participation has 
been recognised as a key ingredient of good governance (Coffey, 2005; Msomphora & 
Aanesen, 2015), a shift towards the new kind of more applied ‘Mode 2 science’ in fisheries 
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research has been noticed (Wilson, 2010). The reforms encourage incorporation of various 
stakeholder-interested groups, including Advisory councils (ACs) and scientists, to provide 
knowledge for policy-making. This may imply that the link for scientific advice from 
researchers to policy-makers is no longer in a direct linear relationship between them. The 
knowledge is constructed in accord with commercial, political or other social interests of the 
bodies that underwrite its production (Gibbons et al., 1994). The explanation of the research 
model is problem-solving oriented. Ideally, the model starts with a problem and then searches 
for solutions, which lead to policy action. But practically, the model often start with the solution 
e.g. discard reduction in EU fisheries, then the scientists are asked or consulted by the society 
(e.g. industry or policy-makers) to generate knowledge (commissioned research) for 
justification or development of the idea. Unlike with Mode 1, where scientist exercise their 
academic freedom, the production of knowledge in fisheries science with ICES-CFP context is 
based on Terms of Reference (ToRs), which dictate “the scientific investigations needed to 
generate the advice” (Wilson, 2010, p. 234). Policy-makers and planners often have a 
preconceived idea of the solution when they start the process, which directs the information 
search to support the arguments needed for framing/defining the problem (Jentoft & 
Chuenpagdee, 2009; Rittel & Webber, 1973). With such a new approach in fisheries 
management, there are dilemmas that accountability may be easily internalised, broadly based 
and self-organised to a degree of own-auditing. 
Wilson (2010) also notices that quality control, in fisheries science with ICES-CFP context, 
seems to be focused on the procedural mechanisms, and the research process itself becomes the 
object of evaluation (cf. Guggenheim, 2006); hence the struggle with poor reliability, credibility 
and quality. So what does this imply for fisheries management policy-making? 
Mode 1 science with no incorporation of various stakeholder-interested groups, except 
scientists themselves, is not perfect either. Despite the rule of data sharing in Mode 1 science, 
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withholding of data still happens (Committee on Science et al., 1995; Savage & Vickers, 2009). 
Data may be withheld for legitimate reasons like anonymity, and this can be the case in either 
Mode 1 or 2. In Mode 1 science it may also happen, that the status of the scientists involved 
may dictate the quality of knowledge produced, and this can be problematic. In fact, Sulkunen 
(2013) has argued that Mode 1 science is not accountable at all in practical terms, such as 
outcomes in welfare or impact on policy effectiveness. But, do we necessarily need to abandon 
all the values and principles of Mode 1 for Mode 2 science?  
May be the solution to the shift, as suggested herein, could be something in-between the two 
ideal Modes, as a ‘Mode 1.5 science’ so to speak with the ethos of science acronym: CULAVS. 
This implies that science should be communal (C), universal (U) but also local (L); that there 
should be academic-freedom in research (A) and assurance of value for money (V); and that it 
(science) should allow for scepticism(S). 
Concluding Remarks 
Stakeholder participation in decision-making, from the management plan to its implementation, 
as recognised in Europe’s recent CFP (STECF, 2013), is a key ingredient of good governance. 
Increased stakeholder participation also applies when it comes to finding solutions for reducing 
practical problems such as discard of the EU fisheries. To achieve this, it requires designing 
and establishing a fisheries management structure that allows for more stakeholder participation 
with its inclination towards ‘co-management’, but with ‘results-based management’ (RBM) 
strategy, as suggested in the EU CFP reforms (CEC, 2009). Hence, the special interest of this 
PhD project study, i.e. to help design such an inclusive, encompassing and democratic 
management set-up in fisheries governance for all the interested parties.  
In agreement with previous studies (Needle et al., 2015; Ruiz et al., 2015; van Helmond et al., 
2015), the current study indicates that the CQM mechanism seems to be a promising candidate 
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that could reduce discard problems under RBM perspectives. The study generates knowledge 
that may generally be applicable in providing some insight into how CQM can sufficiently 
reduce discards within the perspectives of the RBM strategy and how the authorities can 
formulate the CQM mechanism in order to attract fishers’ participation and make it profitable 
for them to comply with the rules (Paper 1). The study also spawns information on how 
stakeholder can successfully take on the responsibilities for management functions (Paper 2), 
and how to improve the chance of successful stakeholder participation (Pape 3). Lastly, the 
thesis provides insights into how we can secure the quality and value of scientific knowledge 
produced for policy-making in fisheries management; and how various interested stakeholder 
groups, apart from scientists themselves, could be incorporated in producing the knowledge 
(Paper 4). 
My interpretation reflects the perspective of ‘democratic pragmatism’, believing that only if 
there is participation by stakeholders in decisions to safeguard fish stocks, will the measures of 
participatory fisheries governance be successful. Decisions and institutions are made more 
legitimate by the participation of user groups and all stakeholders, within the scope of 
interactive governance. 
For details of the research findings of the study, including discussion points and 
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